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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a well-settled principle that patients have a right to self-determination.
Only twenty years ago, courts emphasized that the legal underpinnings of the
informed consent requirement are the individual's autonomy and the right to
self-determination. 2 Law and ethics have come to recognize this right of
self-determination as embracing a competent person's right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment.3 Thus, patient participation in medical
decisionmaking is well established. 4 But how far does this notion of patient
participation go? A lively topic in medical literature is the futility of medical
treatment, in other words, medical treatment that, in the view of the physician,
is nonbeneficial or useless to the patient. Physicians continue to search for a
proper definition of futility, and continue to debate whether the physician or
the patient should be the arbiter on whether a given therapy is "futile."6 One
thing is clear however: if treatment is determined to be futile (whatever that
means), then a physician is under no obligation to continue or offer such
treatment.
7
2 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972).
3See, e.g., Rasmussen ex rel. Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674,681-83 (Ariz. 1987) (en
banc); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass.
1977); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947,951 (Me. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,1222 (N.J.
1985); ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 3.2, at 45-47 (1989).
4 Edmund D. Pellegrino, Ethics, 270 JAMA 202, 202 (1993).
5 Compare John D. Lantos et al., The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, 87 AM. J.
MED. 81, 83 (1989) (suggesting that treatment should be deemed "futile" only after the
physician and patient agree that the likelihood of treatment achieving the desired goals
of the patient and physician is so low that the expected burdens outweigh any minimal
benefits) with Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical
Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 949,950-53 (1990) (defining "futile" treatment
as treatment highly unlikely to produce a desired result based on reasoning, experience,
or empirical evidence, or treatment that fails to improve the patient's prognosis, merely
preserving the patient in a state of permanent unconsciousness or maintaining the
patient's dependence on intensive medical care).
6 Compare Nancy S. Jecker & Robert A. Pearlman, Medical Futility: Who Decides?, 152
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1140,1144 (1992) with StuartJ. Youngner, Who Defines Futility?,
260 JAMA 2094, 2095 (1988).
7 See, e.g., Glen C. Griener, The Physician's Authority to Withhold Futile Treat"ent, 20
J. MED. & PHIL. 207, 208 (1995); Lawrence J. Nelson & Robert M. Nelson, Ethics and the
Provision of Futile, Harnfid, or Burdensome Treatment to Children, 20 CRITICAL CARE MED.
427, 428 (1992); Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Nancy Jecker, Futility in Practice, 153
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 437, 440 (1993); Lance K. Steil, Stopping Treatnent on Grounds
of Futility: A Role for Institutional Policy, 11 ST_ LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 481, 492 (1992); see
also Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Guidelines for the
Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA 1868, 1870 (1991) [hereinafter
AMA GUIDELINES] ("A physician is not ethically obligated to make a specific diagnostic
or therapeutic procedure available to a patient, even on specific request, if the use of
such a procedure would be futile."). One court, in an earlier right to refuse treatment
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The concept of futility has reared its head in some recent court cases, referred
to as physician-refusal cases,8 in which patients, 9 or their surrogate
decisionmakers, have demanded treatment that physicians refuse to offer or
continue because treatment is viewed by physicians as "useless" or
"inappropriate." In one well-known case, physicians wished to disconnect an
87 year old woman (Helga Wanglie) in a persistent vegetative state from a
respirator.10 The patient's husband and children objected to the withdrawal of
treatment, citing the patient's failure to state her preferences regarding life
sustaining treatment.11 Although physicians did not characterize the use of the
respirator as "futile" treatment, they believed it was "non-beneficial" because it
did nothing to change the patient's prognosis or improve her quality of life.
12
The hospital petitioned a court to appoint an independent conservator to make
medical decisions for the patient in lieu of her husband. 13 The court framed the
issue as being "whether it is in the best interest of an elderly woman who is
comatose, gravely ill, and ventilator-dependent to have decisions about her
medical care made by her husband ... or by a stranger."14 Relying on the state's
guardian appointment statute, the court held that the patient's husband was
the person best suited to make medical decisions for the patient and appointed
him as guardian. 15 Although the physicians indicated they would have
petitioned the court for a second hearing on whether they were obliged to
continue the provision of ventilatory treatment they deemed "non-benefi-
case, ostensibly approved of this view. See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
491 (Ct. App. 1983) ("A physician has no duty to continue treatment, once it has proved
to be ineffective.... [Tihere is no duty to continue [treatment] once it has become futile
in the opinion of qualified medical personnel."). Note, however, that in Barber, both the
physicians and the patient's family agreed that treatment was inappropriate. See id. at
486,492-93.
8JamesJ. Murphy, Comment, Beyond Autonomy. Judicial Restraint and the Legal Limits
Necessary to Uphold the Hippocratic Tradition and Preserve the Ethical Integrity of the Medical
Profession, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 451,454 (1993).
9For convenience, throughout this article the term "patient" means either thepatient,
the patient's surrogate decisionmaker, or the patient's proxy appointed under a durable
power of attorney or advance directive. See infra notes 166-68.
lOin re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. P. Ct. Hennepin County July 1, 1991) (order
appointing guardian), reprinted in 2 Biolaw (Updates) § 12-6, at U:2161-:2168 (James F.
Childress & Ruth D. Gaare eds., 1991).
11Steven H_ Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 512, 513 (1991).
12Id.
13 1n re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283, at 2 (order appointing guardian).
141d. at 6.
15 1d. at 7.
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cial," this was unnecessary because the patient died three days after the court
appointed the patient's husband as guardian.16
The underlying contexts in which these physician-refusal cases arise are not
limited to the provision of care for elderly patients. In re Doe17 involved a
terminally ill thirteen-year-old child. 18 Doctors found that Doe suffered from
a degenerative neurological disease, although no particular diagnosis could be
confirmed. 19 Doctors placed her on a ventilator and inserted feeding tubes
surgically.20 Doctors ultimately suggested to Doe's parents that they permit
doctors to enter a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order, and discussed the possibility
of "de-escalating" aggressive treatment.21 One parent agreed to a DNR order
and the de-escalation of life support while the other did not.22 The hospital
filed an action in court seeking a declaration on whether to follow the wishes
of Doe's mother or father.23 The lower court held thatboth parents must concur
in decisions concerning resuscitation and de-escalation of life support, and in
the absence of such concurrence, the hospital was not authorized to proceed.24
The court entered an order enjoining the hospital from entering a DNR order
and de-escalating life support.25 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, relying
heavily on state statutes requiring the concurrence of both parents in decisions
relating to health care for a child. 26 Although neither of these cases directly
addressed the issue whether a physician is required to provide treatment
deemed futile or inappropriate, it will only be a matter of time before courts
undertake to determine the outer limits of patient autonomy and
self-determination.
Part II of this article discusses the concept of futility and reviews various
proposed approaches to defining "futility." This article then shows how
personal value judgments play an integral part in determining futility under
virtually all of these approaches. Part II concludes that a decision that treatment
is futile should not be based on the individual values of only the patient or
physician under the shared decisionmaking model of the physician-patient
relationship. Part III tackles the issue whether a physician must offer or
1 6 Miles, supra note 11, at 513.
17418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992).
1 8 1d. at 4.
1 9 1d.
2 0 1d.
211n re Doe, 418 S.E.2d at 4.
221d.
2 3 1d.
2 4 d. at 4-5.
251n re Doe, 418 S.E.2d at 4-5.
26 [d. at 6-7.
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continue treatment deemed "medically and ethically inappropriate." Part III
first reviews common law doctrines governing the physician-patient
relationship and concludes that these doctrines do not require the physician to
provide every treatment a patient demands, especially when providing such
treatment would force the physician to act contrary to her professional
conscience. Part III also discusses the various state statutes affording physicians
the right not to render treatment considered medically inappropriate or not to
participate in treatment that would violate the physician's professional or
personal conscience. Part INI then discusses a recent Fourth Circuit case 27
holding that physicians are obliged to provide treatment to demanding
patients with emergency medical conditions, as defined in the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act,28 even though physicians determine
that treatment is medically and ethically inappropriate. Part III concludes that,
excepting any applicable statute to the contrary, the prevailing standard of
medical care is the only thing obliging a physician to continue or offer treatment
to a demanding patient, and that the standard of care will rarely, if ever, require
a physician to provide medically and ethically inappropriate treatment. Finally,
this article concludes that the standard of care ultimately should dictate
whether a physician is obliged to prescribe or render treatment deemed
medically inappropriate, the provision of which is contrary to the physician's
professional conscience. When a physician is faced with a situation in which
the patient demands treatment held to be medically inappropriate by a general
consensus of health care providers, the provision of which would contravene
the physician's conscience, the physician should try to resolve the conflict
amicably. The physician should engage in a discussion with the patient and try
to come to an agreement. If both the physician and patient cannot come to
terms, the physician should, with reasonable diligence, attempt a transfer. If a
transfer is not possible, then the physician may refuse to offer or continue such
treatment.
II. THE CONCEPT OF FUTILITY
Medical and legal commentators continue to struggle in their search for an
acceptable definition of the term "futility."29 To this day, there is no consensus
among medical professionals about whether any given medical treatment is
futile under a certain set of circumstances. 30 Commentators acknowledge the
271n re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
2842 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
29 See, e.g., J. Randall Curtis et al., Use of the Medical Futility Rationale in
Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation Orders, 273 JAMA 124, 124 (1995) (noting that there is no
generally accepted definition of medical futility); seealso Thomas A. Raffin, Withdrawing
Life Support:Howls the DecisionMade?, 273JAMA 738,738(1995) (stating that the concept
of futility is "ill-defined when applied to the majority of critically ill patients with poor
prognoses.").
30 Lantos et al., supra note 5,at 81; Schneiderman & Jecker, supra note 7, at 438; see also
In re Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("[Flutility can have a different
1994-951
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difficulty in classifying treatments as "futile."3 1 Futility is a nebulous and
subjective concept that usually incorporates the different value judgments of
physicians and patients. 32 I will briefly discuss some of the proposed
approaches to defining medical treatment as futile, and then argue that,
because of the indeterminate nature of the concept of futility in the context of
medical decisionmaking, a search for the meaning of "futility" is unavailing.33
A. Approaches to Defining Futility
One commentator has noted that "[tihe word 'futile' has a categorical ring
that masks a more subtle complexity."34 Futility, according to this commentator,
can be defined in various ways. Futility can be defined in physiological terms,3 5
will the therapy achieve the physiological goal it is expected to achieve? For
example, will a blood transfusion raise the recipient's hematocrit level? If, for
example, our blood transfusion recipient is hemorrhaging at a rate that exceeds
the rate of transfusion, then the transfusion would be physiologically futile.
Another example of physiological futility is the use of antibiotics to treat a
virus. Antibiotics, which combat bacterial infections, are ineffective in fighting
viral infections.36 Other commentators have articulated similar standards that
meaning to different physicians in different circumstances."); Judith F. Daar, A Clash at
the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician's Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
1241, 1258 (1993) ("ll1t seems [that] the medical community is not likely to reach a
consensus on how the concept [of futility] should be defined."); Pellegrino, supra note
4, at 203 ("The debate about medical futility is far from over."); Murphy, supra note 8, at
468 n.122 ("[Tihe concept of futility is fraught with numerous interpretations ... ").
31 See, e.g., Mildred Solomon, "Futility" as a Criterion in Limiting Treatment, 327 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1239, 1239 (1992); Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1560, 1561 (1992).
32Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish: Resuscitating Self-Determination for the Critically
Ill, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 23, 63 (1993); Solomon, supra note 31, at 1239; Youngner, supra note
6, at 2095.
33 Some commentators seem to imply this conclusion. See, e.g., Lantos et al., supra
note 5, at 81 ("[F]utility cannot be defined with precision, but is simply the end of a
spectrum of low-efficacy therapies...."). Another commentator has expressed a similar
view on futility as it relates to life support. E. Haavi Morreim, Profoundly Diminished Life:
The Casualties of Coercion, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 33 ("[The] dispute
about whether physicians ethically can, or ought, unilaterally to refuse to provide life
support revolves around fundamentally irresolvable moral conflicts concerning our
most deeply held beliefs about the value of life, especially profoundly diminished life.
Thus the 'futility debate' is itself largely futile.").
34 Younger, supra note 6, at 2094.
351d.
36See Tom Tomlison & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264
JAMA 1276, 1277 (1990).
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consider only the physiological effect the treatment will achieve.37 Futility can
also be defined in terms of postponing death. 38 If death is postponed, then
treatment is not futile. Under this definition, maintaining life-sustaining
treatment would not be futile even though the prognosis of the patient would
never improve. Futility may also be defined in terms of the length or quality of
life.39 Under these definitions, if treatment would merely prolong life for an
insignificantly short duration, or would not restore cognitive function, then
treatment is "futile." Finally, futility may be defined in terms of probability.
40
Under this definition, treatment is deemed futile when the success rate of a
certain procedure is extremely poor, even though the treatment, if successful,
could restore the patient to a quality of life she had before incurring the illness.
One group of commentators41 has suggested an all-encompassing,
systematic approach to determining futility. First, they distinguish between
"effect" and "benefit.'42 Treatment that produces an "effect" merely affects a
patient's physiology without restoring some undefined quality of life.43
Treatment that produces a benefit improves "the patient's prognosis, comfort,
well-being, or general state of health."44 "A treatment that fails to provide such
a benefit-even though it provides a measurable effect-should be considered
futile.' 45 This group of commentators then goes on to define futility in
qualitative and quantitative terms.46 A determination of quantitative futility
requires physicians to conclude that, through their experience or consideration
37See, e.g., Nelson & Nelson, supra note 7, at 428 (stating that unless treatment will
not "reverse a physiological disturbance that will lead to the [patient's] proximate
death," it cannot be considered futile).
38 Younger, supra note 6, at 2094.
391d.
401d.




45Schneiderman et al., supra note 5, at 950; see also Jane M. Trau, Futility, Autonomy,
andInformed Consent, HEALTH PROGRESS, Mar. 1994, at 40,41. Dr. Trau sets forth a similar
dichotomy for futility determinations. Trau distinguishes between short-term and
long-term therapeutic benefits. Id. Short-term benefits relate to the immediate
physiological effect the patient experiences from treatment while long-term benefits
relate to the positive long-term effect the treatment has on the patient's overall
quality-of-life. Id. Under the Trau model, a short-term benefit is akin to an "effect" and
a long-term "benefit" is akin to a benefit under the Schneiderman et al. model. Id.; see
Schneiderman et al., supra note 5, at 950. Trau then proposes that "[t]he goal of medicine
is to restorepatients to a state in which they can pursue a life plan," Trau, supra, at 41-42,
and thus treatment that fails to provide a long-term benefit (i.e., preserving
quality-of-life) is futile. Id. at 44.
46Schneiderman et al., supra note 5, at 951-53.
1994-951
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of reported studies, a given treatment has not worked in the last 100 cases. 47
Qualitatively futile treatment, on the other hand, includes those "treatment[s]
that merely preserve[] permanent unconsciousness or... fail] to end total
dependence on intensive medical care .... 48 A determination of qualitative
futility therefore requires a physician to predict a patient's inability to escape
from the embrace of intensive medical care and achieve "life goals"
post-treatment.49 Treatment found to be either qualitatively or quantitatively
futile fails to provide a "benefit," even though it may produce an incidental
physiological "effect."50 This approach therefore views futility as a broader
concept than mere physiological futility,51 and incorporates probability 52 and
quality-of-life5 3 considerations. It implicitly rejects the definition of futility in
terms of postponing death.54
Another commentator, in urging hospitals to develop institutional policies
governing futility determinations,5 5 has propounded a four-part test for
determinations of futility.56 Under this test, a treatment is futile if it:
(a) fails to hold a reasonable promise for bringing about the patient's
recovery as verified by current medical knowledge and experience, (b)
imposes burdens grossly disproportionate to any expectable patient
benefit, (c) plays no effective role in mitigating the patient's discomfort,
and (d) serves only to artificially postpone the moment of the patient's
death by sustaining, supplanting or restoring a vital function. .. ."57
Part (a) of this approach incorporates a determination of probability;
specifically, it asks how probable it is that the treatment will bring about the
patient's recovery. Part (b) weighs the general burdens and benefits of the
4 71d. at 951.
481d. at 952. The commentators note that a "patient has no right to be sustained in a
state in which he or she has no purpose other than mere vegetative survival .... Id.
4 91d. at 952-53.
5 0 Schneiderman et al., supra note 5, at 950-51.
51 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
52See supra text accompanying note 40.
53See supra text accompanying note 39.
54See Schneiderman et al., supra note 5 at 952 (noting that treatment preserving life
without consciousness and requiring "constant monitoring, ventilatory support, and
intensive care nursing" is futile); see also William A. Knaus et al., Do Objective Estimates
of Chances for Survival Influence Decisions to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment?, 10 MED.
DECISION MAKING 163, 163 (1990) (stating that "treatment that [merely] prolongs the
process of dying but offers no realistic chance of improvement" is futile).





treatment, while part (c) looks at whether the treatment achieves the particular
benefit of diminishing patient discomfort. Part (b) potentially includes
quality-of-life considerations; could it not be argued that the burdens of a
therapy are grossly disproportionate to the expected benefits if the therapy, for
example, involves very costly and invasive measures that would merely
preserve the patient in a state of permanent unconsciousness?
Assuming "discomfort" in part (c) means physical discomfort, part (c)
potentially embraces the concept of physiological futility by focusing on the
treatment's "effectiveness" in alleviating patient discomfort. The question in
many cases will be whether the treatment will mitigate, by physiological
means, the patient's discomfort or pain.
Part (d) of this commentator's approach, like the approach articulated by
other commentators, 58 implicitly rejects the definition of futility in terms of
postponing death.59 Part (d), however, implicitly draws on quality-of-life
considerations. Applying part (d), if an individual were unable to carry out a
vital life-sustaining function (e.g., respiration), necessary intensive
interventions (e.g., ventilatory treatment) would merely postpone death and,
by their nature, would inevitably have a significant impact on the patient's
quality of life.60
All of these approaches to defining futility fail to expressly consider patient
values or goals. Instead, they all rely on a physician's assessment whether, for
example, the treatment would achieve any physiological effect, or whether the
probability of success is high enough to characterize the treatment as effective.
One commentator suggests that the definition of futility should expressly
consider the goals of the patient, and to some degree, the probability that the
patient's goals will be achieved through the provision of medical treatment.61
Under this standard, only if the "treatment will not produce [the] benefit sought
by the patient, [can it] be considered futile."62 The American Medical
Association (AMA) has proposed a similar standard for defining futility in the
realm of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).63 The AMA stated that
"[r]esuscitative efforts . . . would be considered futile if they could not be
expected to achieve the goals expressed by the informed patient."64
Thus, definitions of futile treatment have generally incorporated one or more
of three considerations:
58 See supra notes 41-50, 54 and accompanying text.
59 See supra text accompanying note 38.
60 For an example of how a respirator can adversely affect a patient's quality-of-life,
see Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (Ct. App. 1984) or Foody v.
Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 716-17 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984).
61Daar, supra note 30, at 1255.
621d.
63AMA Guidelines, supra note 7.
641d. at 1870.
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(1) the benefit that the treatment will produce (e.g., purely
physiological benefits-administering levadopa to patients afflicted
with Parkinson's disease to increase synaptic dopamine; restoring
quality of life-performing kidney transplantation in a patient
previously dialysis dependent; preserving length of life or postponing
death-administering AZT to an AIDS patient to control viral
replication; and mitigating patient discomfort-administering analgesic
medication, such as morphine, to a patient with terminal cancer);
(2) the treatment's probability of success; and
(3) the patient's goals in receiving the treatment.
B. Personal Value Judgments Inhere in Futility Determinations
"[V]alue judgments add an interpretation of the facts [of a case] in terms of
what is 'good' or 'bad,' or what 'ought' or 'ought not' be done."65 Value
judgments, in the context of medical decisionmaking, are personal and
embrace an individual's views about risk taking, the significance of a benefit,
quality of life, and the importance of a therapy's probability of success.66
Definitions of futility that embody any one of the three considerations noted
above generally require value judgments. 67
Determining whether a benefit will be gained from a certain medical
procedure, the first of three major considerations noted above, involves a value
judgment. While postponing death for one week may seem worthless to some,
others may find it a noble cause.68 For example, consider the elderly patient
nearing death who wants to see the grandchild she was never able to meet.69
One person may value life even if it is limited by extreme pain and handicap.70
Others may have a lower tolerance for pain and would rather die than live a
debilitative life.
65 Tomlinson & Brody, supra note 36, at 1277.
66 See id.
6 7E.g., Youngnersupra note 6, at 2095 (observing that all definitions except those that
consider only the physiological effect on the patient involve value judgments). In the
Wanglie case, see discussion supra part I, for example, value judgments played a
significant part in the surrogate's decision to have Mrs. Wanglie's ventilatory support
maintained and the physician's objection to the continuation of such treatment. See
Felicia Ackerman, The Significance of a Wish, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at
27, 28 (noting that the doctors and Mrs. Wanglie's husband did not "disagree about
whether maintaining Mrs. Wanglie on a respirator [was] likely to prolong her life[, but
rather,] whether her life [was] worth prolonging"); see also supra text accompanying note
12.





Certain physicians may think that because very few terminally ill patients
eventually leave the hospital after receiving CPR,71 CPR on these patients is
ineffective and thus futile.72 Some of these physicians may believe that
prolonging life for a brief duration is not a worthy objective. When a patient
believes that prolonging life, albeit for a short duration, is a goal worth
pursuing, there exists a rivalry of values. 73 In sum, patients and physicians may
perceive the objectives and benefits of treatment and quality of life
differently,74 and whether a certain therapy provides the recipient with a
"benefit" is a matter of opinion rooted in personal mores.
Physiological futility appears to be value-free75 because it merely involves a
question of medical science.76 But this assertion does not always hold true.77
For example, if a physiological effect through a given treatment occurs between
0% and .01% of the time, virtually all patients and physicians would agree,
based on their values concerning the probability of success, that this treatment
would be useless in achieving the desired physiological effect. It could be
argued, however, that the treatment is not physiologically futile because of the
possibility, albeit extremely slight, of the treatment achieving the desired
physiological effect. Characterizing a treatment as "useless" based on the
extremely low chance that a physiological effect will occur requires an opinion
that this low probability is not worth pursuing, not a scientific determination
that the physiological effect sought is scientifically impossible.78 However,
when it is certain that a therapy will provide no physiological effect, then it
cannot be argued that values play a role in determining the therapy's
usefulness. 79
71See, e.g., Paul C. Sorum, Limiting Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 57 ALB. L. REV. 617,
618 (1994) (noting that approximately 10% of those patients who receive CPR "live long
enough to leave the hospital"); see also Boozang, supra note 32, at 24 (noting that "CPR
is a... medical intervention which for many patients has a remote chance of success").
72Sorum, supra note 71, at 620.
73Truog et al., supra note 31, at 1561.
74Daar, supra note 30, at 1254.
75See id.
76Robert M. Veatch & Carol M. Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the Physician
in Setting Limits, 18 Am. J.L. & MED. 15, 18 (1992); see supra text accompanying notes
35-37.
77See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 76, at 19 (arguing that values sometimes play a role
in questions of physiological futility).
781d. ("[I]f the patient and clinician simply disagree over whether an agreed upon
one-in-one-thousand chance is worth it, the dispute is not scientific, but valuative.").
79See Youngner, supra note 6, at 2095. A treatment that certainly yields no
physiological effect will be referred to throughout this article as strictly physiologically
futile treatment. Almost everything in clinical medicine is based on probability, not
certainty. Griener, supra note 7, at 211; see Tomlinson & Brody, supra note 36, at 1276.
Thus, the instances in which strict physiological futility could apply are very limited
1994-951
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Having individual physicians decide statistical cutoff points at which
treatment is deemed futile also involves value judgments. Physicians
frequently disagree about the weight to be placed on the probability of a
therapy's outcome.80 For example, while one physician may believe that a 2%
probability of success constitutes the point at which a given treatment becomes
futile, another physician may believe that a 9% probability of success is the
critical cutoff point.81 This difference of opinion can be explained not in terms
of medical science, but in terms of the personal values that underlie such
conclusions; a physician may ask whether it is worth pursuing a treatment that
has an x% probability of therapeutic success in light of the time, effort, and
resources that will be expended, the risks to the patient, and the benefit to be
gained from the treatment.82 The physician's answer will depend on her values
concerning risk taking and the worth of the outcome that is sought. Patients
also weigh probability differently depending on their condition, the risks of the
treatment, and their inclination toward pessimism or optimism. Thus, whether
a given rate of success fares favorably in a risk-benefit analysis depends on the
value judgments of the individual physician and patient.
Additionally, social and psychological considerations may influence a
physician's expectations of success.83 For example, a physician may determine
that a liver transplant would be futile in an alcoholic patient who is unlikely to
and not helpful for most cases in which the physician and patient experience a conflict
of values.
8 OLantos et al., supra note 5, at 82.
81 d. (noting that while some physicians will find that a treatment is futile only if its
success rate is 0%, other physicians will characterize treatment as futile in cases in which
the success rate approaches 13%); see also Curtis et al., supra note 29, at 127 (reporting
that a group of internal medicine residents each considered CPR futile at different points
along a spectrum of probabilities concerning patient survival and ultimate discharge
from the hospital, ranging from less than 1% to more than 20%).
82 This implies that futility determinations based on probability are never based on
probability alone, but include consideration of other factors, such as the risks and
benefits of a given therapy. For example, certain patients diagnosed with pancreatic
cancer are eligible for a potentially curative surgical procedure known as the Whipple
procedure or a pancreaticoduodenectomy. See Robert J. Mayer, Pancreatic Cancer, in
HARRISONS PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1532, 1533 (Kurt J. Isselbacher et al. eds.,
13th ed. 1994). The purpose of this procedure is to remove the pancreatic tumor. See id.
The procedure is associated with a high mortality rate and its probability of success is
low. Id. In addition, length of life after complete surgical excision of the tumor is
generally short in duration. Id. While a physician would not necessarily view this
treatment as futile on its low probability of success alone, this low probability in
combination with the short length of life the patient will experience after successful
treatment may make the treatment a more compelling candidate for a futility
determination.
8 3 Lantos et al., supra note 5, at 82.
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practice abstinence, and who would thereby subvert the operation's
therapeutic goals.84
Finally, value judgments are intrinsic to both the patient's and physician's
determination of therapeutic goals. Definitions of futility based on whether a
given treatment will achieve the goals of the patient involve value judgments.
While a physician may be able to provide the therapy that will ensure the
outcome sought by the patient, the physician may not deem that outcome
worthwhile. As noted above, the achievement of physiological results may be
considered "beneficial" by the patient, but not by the physician. Thus, value
judgments are invariably present in efforts to define futility, as demonstrated
by the preceding evaluation of the three considerations generally embodied in
futility definitions.
C. A Decision that a Therapy Is Futile Should Not Be Based on Individual Values
So what's wrong with value judgments? They are a part of life. For example,
when one goes to the supermarket, value judgments abound in a decision to
buy a certain type of orange juice: Do I prefer fresh-squeezed or juice from
concentrate? Can I afford to buy premiumbrand or only the store brand? Which
one tastes the best? Physicians are trained in the medical arts and their value
judgments can be very helpful to patients. For example, a surgeon may believe
the risks of a certain surgical procedure outweigh the benefits to be gained. If
the patient is offered the surgical procedure, under the doctrine of informed
consent, the physician must inform the patient of the procedure's concomitant
benefits and risks.85 However, nothing in the law of informed consent requires
the physician to state her opinion that a certain risk is worth taking. The
decision whether a risk is worth taking rests with the patient.86 Nonetheless, a
patient will often seek a physician's opinion on whether a proposed course of
treatment is worth pursuing based on the risks and expected benefits.8 7 It is
here that a physician's value judgment plays a significant role. The patient will
decide whether to undergo surgery by weighing the physician's opinion-or
84Id.
8 5 FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT To TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 1.12.1, at 45 (2d
ed. 1990).
86 The patient ultimately determines whether to undergo a proposed treatment or
procedure. Failure to obtain the patient's consent before administering a treatment is an
intentional tort for which the patient may recover for any damages thereby incurred.
See, e.g., Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.'), overruled on other grounds by
Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
8 7 See David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267
JAMA 2101, 2102 (1992); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy:
Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CoNTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47,54 (1994).
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the physician's expressed values in the form of an opinion--and the patient's
own values.
While value judgments are a necessary part of medical decisionmaking,88
they should not be the basis for classifying a therapy as futile:
The claim that a treatment is futile has serious ethical consequences
for both physicians and patients. It may apparently justify decisions to
withhold or withdraw therapy, including life-prolonging therapy. It
may seem to lessen the physician's obligation to discuss therapies with
patients and thus decrease patients' participation in decisions about
their care. Some even argue that physicians are obliged to withhold
futile therapies ....
89
Value judgments in medical decisionmaking pose no problem, and are
helpful to the patient, when both physician and patient values are harmonious,
and both the physician and patient can agree on a course of treatment. Butwhat
if both the physician and patient disagree on the "usefulness" of a medical
treatment? The physician-patient relationship has evolved from one in which
physicians received deference for primary decisionmaking for the patient to
one in which patients, along with physicians, play a key role in determining
the course of their medical care.90 Based on this contemporary notion of shared
decisionmaking, both the physician's recommendations and the patient's
ultimate decision on a proposed course of treatment are essential to any
medical decision.91 Thus, neither a patient's nor a physician's value judgment
alone should shape a futility determination. A treatment should not be
designated as "futile" or "non-futile" based on one person's mores. With the
exception of strict physiological futility,92 designations of futility are primarily
8 8Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 6, a t 1140; Tomlinson & Brody, supra note 36, at 1277;
see also Murphy, supra note 8, at 479-80 ("IT]he ability to make value judgments is
essential to the physician's fulfilling his duty to protect and benefit his patients.").
89Lantos et al., supra note 5, at 81 (footnotes omitted); accord Ronald Cranford &
Lawrence Gostin, Futility: A Concept in Search of Definition, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE
307, 308 (1992) ("Once a decision is framed by the term, 'futility,' it provides a
justification for physicians to either 1) override the wishes of the patient ... or...
surrogate[], or 2) make a non-treatment decision without even obtaining informed
consent....").
9 0Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce Resources:
Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CoNN. L. REV. 349, 355 (1993); see also Pellegrino, supra note
4, at 202 ("The right of patients ... to participate in medical decisions is now firmly
established in law and ethics.").
91MEISEL, supra note 3, § 2.3, at 19-20.
9 2Truog et al., supra note 31, at 1561. Treatment is strictly physiologically futile only
when it is certain that the physiological effect sought from the treatment cannot be
achieved. As noted above, supra note 79, since the success or non-success of almost all




based on personal values, and a physician is no more qualified than a patient93
to determine whether, for example, living in a state of permanent
unconsciousness is an acceptable quality of life, or whether a
one-in-one-hundred chance is worth taking. Thus, futility determinations that
embrace value judgments can "plausibly be viewed as not purely medical,"94
and should not be relegated exclusively to the medical profession.
Nor should the determination of futility be assigned exclusively to the
patient. While the value judgments of the patient are important, a physician's
clinical recommendations are not insignificant.95 Physicians treat patients
every day and come to learn of a therapy's general efficacy for certain classes
of persons and illnesses. Their clinical experiences can provide invaluable
insight to desperate patients, who may have unrealistic expectations about the
likelihood of success or the benefits to be gained from a certain therapy. By
giving the patient sole authority to determine whether treatment is futile, the
shared decisionmaking model of the physician-patient relationship is reduced
to little more than "'vending machine medicine."'9 6 Unlike some
commentators, who suggest that the goals of a patient should control
determinations of futility,97 this article argues that patient goals are not the only
relevant considerations in making futility determinations.
Value judgments, which are inevitably entangled with futility
determinations, 98 leave room for subjectivity and render the establishment of
some touchstone to guide physicians in making futility determinations
virtually impossible. The patient's eligibility for a certain treatment would be
left to chance. For example, the administration of treatment that would do no
more than prolong life in a state of permanent unconsciousness could depend
on the fortuity of arriving at a hospital at which physicians do not regard such
treatment as futile.99 Futility determinations are usually made near the end of
93 See Boozang, supra note 32, at66 (contending that "physicians have neither the skill
nor knowledge to exercise authority over value-based patient treatment decisions").
94 Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2103.
95See Murphy, supra note 8, at 479-82; see also Pellegrino, supra note 87, at 50-51
("Physicians are needed to provide information and to discuss this information with
patients to enable and empower them to use their autonomy wisely.").
96Nelson & Nelson, supra note 7, at 431; see also Morreim, supra note 33, at 37 ("The
physician-patient relationship is not an irrevocable indentured servitude, but a
commitment to bring one's best knowledge and skill to help thepatient meet important
needs."); Pellegrino, supra note 87, at 59 (arguing that to allow patients to demand any
medical procedure they want "depreciates [the physician's] expertise [and] makes him
a technical instrument of another person's wishes").
97See, e.g., Daar, supra note 30, at 1254-55.
98 See supra part ll.B.
99 See Griener, supra note 7, at 212. Dr. Griener notes that by allowing individual
physicians to make futility decisions based upon their own personal values, patients
may or may not receive treatment depending upon "who their physician happens to be,
rather than upon their medical condition." One study has found that, in Canada,
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life,100 when a decision that a treatment is futile means the withholding or
withdrawal of treatment and eventual death. 101 Such decisions should not be
grounded in the subjective views of individual physicians.
In sum, the determination that a treatment is "futile," except when grounded
in a finding of strict physiological futility,102 involves value judgments. Because
value judgments embrace a person's own views concerning quality of life and
risk taking, decisions involving value judgments tend to be subjective. Under
the current model of medical decisionmaking (i.e., shared decisionmaking),
value judgments of either the patient or physician alone should not be the basis
for a futility determination. A determination of futility should be made by the
patient and physician together, only after careful consideration of the views of
both parties. A corollary to this assertion is that futility determinations will not
be possible unless both patient and physician values are consonant. But a
determination that a treatment is futile is only consequential when patient and
physician values diverge. This discord is "best seen as involving a conflict of
values rather than a question of futility."103 Thus, searching for a definition of
futility in cases involving physician-patient disagreement is, in and of itself,
futile. But this does not end the inquiry. It still must be determined whether a
physician must provide treatment deemed "medically"104 and "ethically"105
patients and their families can expect to face substantially different viewpoints among
health care workers on the appropriateness of withdrawing life support from a critically
ill patient under the same or similar circumstances. Deborah J. Cook et al., Determinants
in Canadian Health Care Workers of the Decision to Withdraw Life Support from the Critically
Ill, 273 JAMA 703, 706-07 (1995).
100 See Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2102.
101Lar'tos et al., supra note 5, at 81. But see David K. Lee et al., Withdrawing Care:
Experience in a Medical Intensive Care Unit, 271 JAMA 1358, 1358 (1994) (noting the
potential long-term survival of some patients after the withdrawal of life-sustaining
measures regarded as futile).
102 See supra notes 79,92 and accompanying text.
103Truog et al., supra note 31, at 1561; see also Veatch & Spicer, supra note 76, at 20
(noting that a disagreement between physician and patient as to whether a treatment is
beneficial constitutes a "value disagreement"). When this disagreement arises, it is the
resultof the physician and patient "draw[ing] on [their] own sources of values-religion,
family, ethnic identity and culture-to decide whether[, for example,] extra days in
end-stage renal disease, in full-blown AIDS crisis, or in a permanent vegetative state are
worth the burdens and costs of the intervention." Id.
104Because this article argues that determining futility is an unavailing labor when
patient and physician values conflict, I will hereinafter refer to treatment that physicians
deem "futile" or "useless" as "medically inappropriate" to avoid the futility label.
Treatment is "medically inappropriate" when an individual physician determines that
treatment should not be provided because doing so would contravene the medical
standard of care under the circumstances. This definition assumes an established
standard of care which is derived from customary practice or a general consensus
among physicians in a particular field of medicine.
105Ethically inappropriate treatment is referred to throughout this article as treatment
that an individual physician regards as medically inappropriate, the provision of which
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inappropriate in the face of patient demands. The issue whether a patient who
deems medical treatment inappropriate is required to accept that treatment per
the demand of a physician has been resolved by many courts. 106 Most
jurisdictions agree that competent patients, and to some extent incompetent
patients, have a right to refuse treatment that provides a slight chance for
meaningful recovery, even when physicians view such treatment as
beneficial. 107 The next section will focus on the former question: whether a
physician must provide treatment viewed as medically and ethically
inappropriate to the demanding patient.
III. THE PHYSICIAN'S OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE TREATMENT DEEMED
MEDICALLY AND ETHICALLY INAPPROPRIATE
There appears to be general agreement among medical professionals that
health care providers are not ethically obliged to render medically
inappropriate treatment, even when patients demand such treatment.1 08 This
principle is said to have historical roots.109 Under the Hippocratic tradition,
physicians have an "affirmative obligation to refuse to provide medical
treatment when medicine cannot cure the disease or improve the patient's
condition."110 The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research noted:
Although competent patients ... have the legal and ethical authority
to forego some or all care, this does not mean that patients may insist
on particular treatments. . . . A health care professional has an
obligation to allow a patient to choose from among medically
acceptable treatment options.., or to reject all options. No one, however,
has an obligation to provide interventions that would, in his or her judgment,
be countertherapeutic.
111
would contravene that individual physician's conscience or sense of medical ethics.
106MEISEL, supra note 3, § 3.2, at 27 (Supp. 1994); see also Thor v. Superior Court, 855
P.2d 375, 386 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) ("[T]he patient's choice must be respected regardless
of the doctors judgment....").
10 7 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 3.2, at 27 (Supp. 1994). The medical profession has come to
accept this view as well. Michael A. Rie, The Limits of a Wish, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
July-Aug. 1991, at 24, 24.
108See, e.g., Schneiderman & Jecker, supra note 7, at 440.
109See Nancy S. Jecker, Knowing Wlen to Stop: The Limits of Medicine, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., May-June 1991, at 5, 6-7; Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 6, at 1140; Lantos et al.,
supra note 5, at 81 ('The prudent Greek physician had an obligation not to treat
'incurable' diseases.").
11OMurphy, supra note 8, at 466; accord Pellegrino, supra note 4, at 202.
1 1 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT
DECISIONS 44 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N] (emphasis added) (footnote
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The medical profession is experiencing a 180-degree turnaround in medical
ethics.112 The patient and physician have switched roles. In the 1970s and 1980s,
it was the patient who sought to avoid treatment that physicians felt ethically
obligated to provide.113 Now, it is the physician who is "refusing" to provide
medically inappropriate treatment to the patient who demands it. Courts have
only recently begun to deal with these "physician-refusal" cases. 114 However,
these courts have not yet directly confronted the issue whether a patient has a
right to medically inappropriate treatment, the provision of which is contrary
to the physician's conscience.1 15 At firstglance, it appears that these courts have
upheld a patient's right to receive treatment; but a closer look reveals that they
did not hold outright that patients can demand medically inappropriate
treatment. Rather, their holdings were grounded on federal or state statutes
that either assign the patient or her surrogate, and not the physician, the right
to make all health care decisions, 11 6 or require that physicians provide
treatment under certain emergency circumstances. 117 This article will now
discuss how the common law and statutory law tend to preserve the right of
physicians to decline to provide treatment that would contravene their
professional or personal consciences. This article will conclude that, excepting
a statute to the contrary,11 8 the only thing obliging a health care provider to
omitted); see also id. at 219 ("[A] decision ... not to try predictably futile endeavors is
ethically ... justifiable.").
112See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 76, at 15.
113See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
114 E.g., In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994); In re Doe,
418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992); In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. P. Ct. Hennepin County
July 1,1991) (order appointing guardian), reprinted in 2 Biolaw (Updates), supra note 9,
§ 12-6, at U:2161-:2168; see also Alexander M. Capron, Baby Ryan and Virtual Futility,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 20,20-21 (discusing a case in which physicians
wanted to discontinue what was projected to be long-term dialysis for an infant
apparently born with severe brain damage and kidney problems despite the parents'
request to continue treatment).
115 See Boozang, supra note 32, at 62. In England, though, one court has addressed this
issue. An appellate court held that physicians are under no obligation to render
trea tment judged inappropriate. In re BabyJ (C.A. June 3,1992), discussed in Ross Kessel,
British Judges Cannot Order Doctors to Treat, HAsTINGs CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1992, at 3.
116 E.g., In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d at 7 (holding that under a Georgia statute, both parents
of a terminally ill child must consent before a hospital can enter a do-not-resuscitate
(DNR) order); In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283, at 7-8 (order appointing guardian)
(determining that under a Minnesota guardianship statute, it was in the patient's best
interest that her husband make her health care decisions).
117 See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 594-95 (holding that a hospital is required to provide
care for an anencephalic infant brought in for respiratory distress, which constitutes an
emergency medical condition under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
118Although this article discusses one contrary statute, see infra partlIl.D.2 (discussing
a case in which the Fourth Circuit held that the Emergency Medical Treatment and
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provide treatment is the standard of care, and that the standard of care should
rarely, if ever, require a health care giver to provide medically inappropriate
treatment to a demanding patient.
A. Common Law Abandonment
The law of abandonment is relevant when a physician, after beginning
treatment of a patient, decides to withdraw treatment because the physician
believes that it no longer provides a benefit or is unlikely to produce any
measurable effect. It may also be relevant when a physician commences a
physician-patient relationship and withholds treatment demanded by the
patient.1 l9 The law of abandonment provides that once a patient engages a
physician to treat a condition, the physician is under an obligation to "give [the]
patient all necessary and continued attention as long as the case requires."1 20
But the law of abandonment does not require that a physician continue the
professional relationship if, for example, the patient is persistently
noncompliant.1 21 Once a physician-patient relationship is initiated, and the
patient requires medical attention, the physician may leave the relationship by
acquiring the consent of the patient or by giving reasonable notice and
affording the patient a reasonable opportunity to procure another competent
health care provider to continue care.122
Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, requires a health care provider receiving federal
funds to provide ventilatory treatment to an anencephalic baby who arrives at the
provider's emergency room with respiratory distress, even though such treatment is
arguably medically inappropriate, In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 594-95), it is beyond the scope
of this article to discuss other statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), that could potentially require health care providers to render arguably
inappropriate treatment. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(holding thatphysicians violate theADA by withholding ventilatory treatment from an
anencephalic infant suffering from respiratory distress based on her anencephaly), affd
on other grounds, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994); David Orentlicher,
Rationing and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 271 JAMA 308, 311 (1994) (observing
the potential for physicians to violate the ADA by withholding "marginally beneficial
care" from a patient based on the patient's particular disability).
119Physicians have no obligation to commence a professional relationship with
everyone who seeks their services, e.g., Watson v. Sharp Air Freight Servs., Inc., 788 F.
Supp. 722,724 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Findlay v. Board Of Supervisors, 230 P.2d 526,531 (Ariz.
1951); Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 1977), but once the professional
relationship is commenced, the physician may not exit the relationship absent consent
or without giving the patient a reasonable opportunity to procure another health care
provider, infra text accompanying note 122.
120Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ky. 1963); accord Vann v. Harden, 47
S.E.2d 314,319 (Va. 1948) ("After a physician has accepted employment..., it is his duty
to continue his services so long as they are necessary.").
121 See Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (Ct. App. 1982).
122 E.g., Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172,182 (Conn. 1976); Miller v. Greater Southeast
Community Hosp., 508 A.2d 927,929 (D.C. 1986); Capps v. Valk, 369 P.2d 238,240 (Kan.
1962); Johnson, 370 S.W.2d at 596; Johnston v. Ward, 344 S.E.2d 166, 170 (S.C. Ct. App.
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The doctrine of abandonment does not mandate that a physician offer or
provide medically inappropriate treatment to a patient. It requires only that a
physician render care until her services are no longer necessary.123 A
physician's services are not necessary if the treatment is medically
inappropriate, that is, if the provision of treatment would violate the medical
standard of care. 124 But if there is a dispute about whether a certain treatment
is medically inappropriate by virtue of the absence of an established standard
of care, then under the doctrine of abandonment, a physician cannot
unilaterally terminate the professional relationship without giving the patient
reasonable notice of withdrawal and affording the patient a reasonable
opportunity to seek treatment from another health care provider.125 Once
reasonable notice and opportunity are provided, however, the physician is no
longer obligated to provide treatment.
Thus, the doctrine of abandonment, in addition to safeguarding patient
welfare, incidentally preserves the right of a physician not to participate in
treatment that would violate her sense of ethics by allowing the physician to
leave the relationship merely by giving notice and a reasonable opportunity to
find another health care provider. The law of abandonment does not support
a patient's right to demand continued treatment from a refusing physician, at
least once reasonable notice and opportunity are given.
B. Informed Consent and the Competent Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment
A person's interest in bodily integrity and self-determination is deeply
entrenched in our common law.126 "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint and
interference of others .... "127 A physician's obligation to obtain informed
consent from the patient is derived from the principles of bodily integrity and
self-determination. 128 The obligation to obtain informed consent is both an
ethical requirement and a legal "standard of care" owed to the patient.129 The
law of informed consent requires thata physician obtain consent before treating
1986); Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211-12 (Utah 1937); Lee v. Dewbre, 362 S.W.2d 900,
902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 236
(1981).
123 SeeC.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Liability of Physician Who Abandons Case, 57A.L.R.2d
432, 437 (1958).
124 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
125See Miller, 508 A.2d at 929; Capps, 369 P.2d at 240.
126 1n re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (N.J. 1985).
12 7Union Pac. Ry. v. Bostford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
128 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep'tof Health, 497 U.S. 261,269 (1990) (plurality opinion).
129Boozang, supra note 32, at 42.
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a patient, 130 and that consent be based on the physician's disclosure and
explanation of all information material to the patient's decision: 13 1 the nature
and purpose of the treatment,13 2 its expected benefits,133 the foreseeable
material risks,134 the reasonable alternatives to the treatment,135 and the
foreseeable risks of foregoing the treatment. 136 The United States Supreme
Court just five years ago observed that "the common law doctrine of informed
consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent
individual to refuse medical treatment.' 13 7
But do these principles of patient autonomy embrace a right to demand
medically inappropriate treatment? 138 The right to refuse treatment and the
informed consent doctrine require that the patient make the ultimate decision
whether to undergo a proposed course of treatment that the physician has
offered the patient. These rights do not, as a corollary, allow a patient to demand
medically inappropriate treatment from a health care provider when providing
130E.g., Mims v. Boland, 138 S.E.2d 902, 906 (Ga. 1964); Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 444 So.
2d 143,143-44 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Pugsley v. Privette, 263 S.E.2d 69, 74 (Va. 1980).
131 E.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 905 (Cal. 1980) (en banc).
132See, e.g., Corn v. French, 289 P.2d 173, 175-76 (Nev. 1955).
133RozovsKY, supra note 85, § 1.12, at 45.
134E.g., Trunian, 611 P.2d at 906; Driers v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561, 564 (App. Div.
1980); Holt v. Nelson, 523 P.2d 211, 216 (Wash. 1974). The physician, however, is not
required to disclose risks that are likely to be known by the average patient or which
the patient actually knows. See Wilkinson v. Vessey, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (R.I. 1972).
135See, e.g., Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294,301 (Conn. 1983); Sard v.
Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Md. 1977).
136E.g., Truman, 611 P.2d at 906; Holt, 523 P.2d at 216.
137Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,277 (1990) (plurality opinion).
The Court also stated that "[t]he principle thata competentperson has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from
our prior decisions." Id. at 278.
138Many commentators argue no. See, e.g., Cranford & Gostin, supra note 89, at 309;
John J. Paris et al., Physician's Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case of Baby L, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1012, 1014 (1990) (noting that the doctrine of informed consent does not
endorse a patient's right to treatment that a physician views as futile or harmful);
Murphy, supra note 8, at 477 ("[Nlone of the major health care cases from Quinlan to
Brophy to ... Cruzan ... supports the right of a patient to demand a specific intervention
from a physician." (footnote omitted)). But see Marcia Angell, The Case ofHelga Wanglie:
A New Kind of Right to Die Case, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 511, 511 (1991) (commenting on
the correctness of the decision by the court in In re Wanglie to appoint Mrs. Wanglie's
husband as the decisionmaker and noting that "any other decision by the court would
have been inimical to patient autonomy and would have undermined the consensus on
the right to die that has been carefully crafted since the Quinlan case"); Boozang, supra
note 32, at 69 ("A patient's right to demand futile treatment implicates the same legal
rights as those at issue in 'right-to-die' cases and consequently should be governed by
that jurisprudence.").
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treatment would violate the provider's conscience.139 The informed consent
doctrine and the right to refuse treatment do not imply a right to any treatment
the patient wants.140
That a physician is not obliged to act contrary to her professional conscience
under the auspices of patient autonomy is illustrated by the results in several
cases. For example, in Conservatorship of Morrison v. Abramovice,141 physicians
raised personal objections to complying with the request of a permanently
unconscious patient's conservator that the patient's nasogastric tube be
removed. 142 The court held that the conservator had authority to make that
decision,143 but could not compel the physicians to carry it out.144 The court
noted that if the physicians refused, however, they must be willing to transfer
the patient to a health care provider who would comply with the conservator's
request.145 Similarly, in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc.,146 the court,
utilizing a substituted judgment standard, found that the patient would have
wanted life-sustaining treatment withdrawn.14 7 The court held that the request
of the patient's family that the patient's gastrostomy tube be removed should
be honored, but that medical professionals could not be forced to act contrary
to their ethical principles:148
Neither ... the doctrine of informed consent nor any other provision
of law requires the hospital to cease [treatment] upon request of the
guardian. There is nothing in [the right to refuse treatment cases]
which would justify compelling medical professionals... to take active
measures which are contrary to their view of their ethical duty toward
their patients.
149
1 3 9 See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 76, at 23 ("Autonomy gives the patient a right to
refuse treatment-that is, to leave the medical relationship.... But that principle cannot
imply that autonomy can give the patient or surrogate a right of access to care.")
1 4 0 See Stell, supra note 7, at 487.




145253 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
146497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
14 7 d. at 631-32.
14 81d. at 639-40; accord In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (II. 1989).
14 9Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 639. But see Gray ex rel. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 591
(D.R.I. 1988) (holding that a hospital and its physicians are required to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment over ethical objections unless the patient can be transferred to
another health care facility where physicians would assent to the patient's request); In
re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J. 1987) (requiring a nursing home to participate in the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment because of the inability to transfer the patient
elsewhere); see also Elbaum ex rel. Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 544
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The court ordered the hospital and its physicians to assist in a transfer to
another health care provider, or to the patient's own home, where the
gastrostomy tube could be withdrawn without offending the professional
consciences of tho physicians.150
C. Preseruing the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession
Amid the emergence of the right to refuse treatment cases, courts articulated
four state interests that could potentially override an individual's decision to
refuse medical treatment: the interests in preserving life, preventing suicide,
protecting innocent third parties, and preserving the ethical integrity of the
medical profession. 151 The interest in preserving the ethical integrity of the
medical profession is implicated when physicians are compelled to act in a
manner that would expose them to criminal or civil liability or, more
importantly, in a manner that would violate prevailing medical ethics. 15
2 This
interest takes priority when a physician refuses to render medically
inappropriate treatment because doing so would violate her sense of
professional ethics.
As one court noted in one of the earlier right to refuse treatment cases,
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
[pirevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception,
demand that all efforts toward life prolongation be made in all
N.Y.S.2d840, 847-48(App. Div. 1989) (per curiam) (holding thatphysicians must, absent
a transfer to a willing health care provider, withdraw life supportover ethical objections,
in part because the physicians and the nursing home where the patient remained failed
to inform the patient's family upon the patient's admission of its policy against
removing life support). These cases, nevertheless, do not bolster a patient's right to
obtain nonbeneficial treatment from a physician. Paris et al., supra note 138, at 1014. The
courts in Gray and lobes, for example, based their decisions on the well-established right
of the patient to refuse treatment. See Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 591; In re Jobes, 529 A.2d at
450. In the physician refusal context, however, there is no well-established right to
receive medically inappropriate treatment, see infra text accompanying note 159, and
thus there is no basis for violating the health care provider's conscience.
150 Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 640.
15 1The first court to expressly articulate all four interests was the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417,425 (Mass. 1977), but courts had previously alluded to one or more of these
interests in deciding cases. E.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972) (alluding
to the interest in protecting innocent third parties); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,663 (N.J.)
(referring to the preservation of life and ethical integrity of the medical profession
interests), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922(1976). Other courts soon followed the Saikewiczcourt,
and the four interest balancing approach has "become almost a catechismic aspect of
judicial right to [refuse treatment] opinions." MEISEL, supra note 3, § 4.12, at 99; see, e.g.,
Satz v. Permutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,1223 (N.J. 1985); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738,743 (Wash.
1983) (en banc).
1 5 2 Martha A. Ma tthews, Comment, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right to Refuse
Lifesaving Treatmient, 75 CAL. L. REV. 707, 733 n.178 (1987).
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circumstances.... Recognition of the right to refuse necessary
treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent with existing
medical mores; such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity
of the medical profession, the proper role of hospitals in caring for such
patients or the State's interest in protecting the same.
153
The proposition that medical ethics are not threatened by allowing a
competent patient to refuse treatment has come to be generally accepted by
both the courts154 and the medical profession.155 Since the prevailing view is
that a physician's assent to a patient's refusal of treatment does not violate
medical ethics, rarely does the interest in preserving the ethical integrity of the
medical profession override the patient's interest in refusing unwanted
treatment.156
When it is the physician who declines to render medically inappropriate
treatment to the demanding patient, however, a different analysis ensues.
There is support for the proposition that a physician may not be compelled to
provide medically inappropriate treatment 57 (i.e., treatment that contravenes
153 Saikewicz, 370 N.E. at 426-27.
154 See, e.g., Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 n.8
(D.D.C. 1985) ("[Mledicalethics incorporates [sic] theduties owed the patient, including
... administering treatment onlywith consent [of the patient]."); Thor v. SuperiorCourt,
855 P.2d 375, 386 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) ("Our conclusion that the patient's choice must
be respected regardless of the doctor's judgment does not denigrate professional
standards of care."); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y.) ("[A] doctor cannot be held to
have violated his legal or professional responsibilities when he honors the right of a
competent... patient to decline medical treatment."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981);
see also In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 75 (Wisc. 1992) ("[T]he existence of a protected right
to refuse treatment . . . may in a sense protect the ethical integrity of the medical
profession. In the absence of such a protected right, physicians may be discouraged from
attempting certain life-sustaining procedures in the first place, knowing that once
connected they may never be removed.").
1555ee, e.g., Report of the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association, 253 JAMA
2424, 2424 (1985) ("The preference of the Ipatient] should prevail when determining
whether extraordinary life-prolonging measures should be undertaken in the event of
terminal illness.").
156 See Saikewicz, 370 N.E. at 426-27; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664-69 (NJ.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Matthews, supra note 152, at 734; Patricia A. Unz, Note,
Euthanasia: A Constitutionally Protected Peaceful Death, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 439, 462
(1992).
157See, e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965) ("[Tlhe
doctor's conscience and professional oath must ... be respected.... [T]he patient [in
this case] sought to dictate to treating physicians a course of treatment amounting to
medical malpractice.... The patient may knowingly decline treatment, but he may not
demand mistreatment."); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 412 (N.J. 1987) ("Even as patients
enjoy control over their medical treatment, health-care professionals remain bound to
act in consonance with specific ethical criteria. We realize that these criteria may conflict
with some concepts of self-determina tion. In the case of such a conflict, a patient has no
right to compel a health care provider to violate generally accepted professional
standards."); see also Rie, supra note 107, at 24 (declaring that patients have no "right to
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the standard of care).158 As a corollary, there is general agreement that patients
do not have a right to every therapy they desire.159 Moreover, commentators
have noted that to compel a physician to provide medically inappropriate
treatment would violate well-established medical ethics.160 The court in the
Brophy case approved of the view that a "hospital and its medical staff 'should
not be compelled.., to [act] contrary to its [sic] moral and ethical principles,
when [these] principles are recognized and accepted within a significant
segment of the medical profession and thehospital community."' 161 Thus, there
is a strong argument that the interest in preserving the ethical integrity of the
medical profession is implicated in these physician-refusal cases based on the
theory that medical professionals may not be compelled to render medically
inappropriate treatment, that to compel them to render medically
inappropriate treatment would violate well-established medical ethics, and
that there is no established right of a patient to receive treatment that is deemed
medically inappropriate. 162 In physician-refusal cases, the interest in
preserving the ethical integrity of the medical profession is weighty and
appears to transcend whatever interest a patient has-if he has one at all-in
receiving medically inappropriate treatment.
make claims against the physician to dispense any medical .. .treatment that [the
physician] believes offers no medical benefit to the patient"); Rosemarie Tong, Towards
a Just, Courageous, and Honest Resolution of the Futility Debate, 20 J. MIED. & PHIL. 165, 170
(1995) ("[Plhysicians have a right to refuse a patient treatment ... if it is medically
inappropriate." (alteration in original)).
158See supra note 104.
159See Pellegrino, supra note 4, at 202; Paris et al., supra note 138, at 1013 ("[Patients]
are not free... to design their own treatment."); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 111, at
44 ('The care available from health care professionals is generally limited to what is
consistent with role-related professional standards and conscientiously held personal
beliefs.").
160See, e.g., Erich H. Loewy & Richard A. Carlson, Futility and Its Wider Implications:
A Concept in Need of Further Examination, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 429,429 (1993);
see also Trau, supra note 45, at 44 (noting that the provision of medically inappropriate
treatment "would be the equivalent to practicing irrational or bad medicine and would
thus be unethical").
161Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626,639 (Mass. 1986) (quoting
with approval the lower court decision).
162 0f course, the assertion of this interest would have to be made by the state and not
by individual health care providers. See In re Dubreuil, 629 So.2d 819, 823 (Fla. 1993)
(holding that a health care provider cannot assert the countervailing state interests on
behalf of the state).
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D. Statutory Law and the Physician's Right Not to Participate in Medically and
Ethically Inappropriate Treatment
1. State Statutory Law and the Physician's Conscience
The view that a physician should not be compelled to provide treatment,
when providing such treatment would offend her personal or professional
conscience, is manifest in state statutory law. For example, many states permit
physicians to decline to participate in abortions. 163 Some statutes provide an
unqualified right not to participate in an abortion,1 64 while others require an
explicit moral or religious objection.165 Outside the abortion context, states
over the past several years have enacted legislation toward preventing
physicians from being compelled to act contrary to their consciences. State
statutes that affirm the right of a patient to refuse treatment through advance
directives, 166 proxies,1 67 or surrogate decisionmakers1 68 provide that health
care providers need not accede to a patient's, proxy's, or surrogate's request to
withdraw or withhold treatment, but must attempt to or successfully effect a
16 3 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (1993); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955
(West 1984);FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(8) (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.414 (West
1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (1995); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i (McKinney
1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-12 (1986); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-106 (1994); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (1988) (maintaining the right of federally funded health care
providers not to participate in abortions if such participation would offend the
provider's religious or moral beliefs).
1 6 4 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i (allowing a refusal for any reason).
16 5 E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955(a).
1 66 An advance directive is a witnessed written document or oral statement in which
a competent person (declarant) expresses his wishes or instructions on the
administration or avoidance of medical treatment under particular circumstances so
that they maybe honored upon the declarant's subsequent inability to make health care
decisions. See MEISEL, supra note 3, § 10.1, at 312-13. Additionally, the declarant can
sometimes use an advance directive to appoint another person to make health care
decisions for the declarant should the declarant become incapacitated. Id. at 313. For
purposes of this article, "living wills" are synonymous with advance directives.
167A proxy is a person appointed in an advance directive to make health care decisions
on behalf of the patient should the patient become incapable of medical decisionmaking.
Id. § 10.4, at 319. "Health care agents" or "attorneys-in-fact" are individuals appointed
by a "principal" in a (health care) durable power of attorney to make health care decisions
for the principal in the event the principal loses decisionmaking capacity. Id. For
purposes of this article, the terms "proxy," "health care agent," and "attorney-in-fact" are
synonymous.
16 8For purposes of this article, a surrogate decisionmaker is a person that, although
not expressly designated by the patient, may be authorized by statute or judicially
appointed to make health care decisions on behalf of the patient should the patient lose
decisionmaking capacity and fail to formulate an advance directive, designate a proxy,
or express his wishes to physicians or others before losing decisionmaking capacity.
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transfer to another health care provider willing to comply with the request.169
Of greater import are those state statutes explicitly recognizing that a
physician cannot be compelled to provide treatment viewed as medically or
ethically inappropriate. 170 Unfortunately, none of these statutes defines
16 9 Some statutes require the health care provider declining to comply with the
treatment request of the patient, proxy, or surrogate decisionmaker to transfer the
patient to a health care provider willing to comply with the request. See Appendix A,
Part A. Some statutes merely require the physician declining to comply with the
treatment request of the patient or decisionmaker to make a reasonable effort to transfer
the patient, but do not necessarily require a successful transfer. See Appendix A, Part
B. Some statutes merely require the unwilling physician to permit, notimpede, or assist
in the transfer of thepatient. SeeAppendix A, PartC. See Appendix A, Part D for statutes
not expressly requiring unwilling physicians to attempt a transfer or to assist in or
permit a transfer. Some statutes are ambiguous about what they require of a physician
unwilling to comply with the patient's or decisionmaker's request. See Appendix A,
Part E. Finally, some statutes are silent as to the physician's obligation to transfer, but
do give immunity to the physician who refuses to carry out a proxy's decision to
withdraw or withhold life support. See Appendix A, Part F.
Some of these statutes expressly aim to prevent patients, proxies, or surrogates
from requiring a health care provider to act contrary to her personal or professional
conscience. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-4508 ("Any physician or other health care provider
who for ethical or professional reasons is incapable or unwilling to conform to the
desires of the patient [or decisionmaker] may withdraw without incurring any civil or
criminal liability provided the physician or other health care provider makes a good
faith effort to assist the patient in obtaining the services of another physician or other
health care provider before withdrawal."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/35 ("A health
care provider who because of personal views or beliefs or his or her conscience is unable to
comply with the terms of a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment shall... assist...
in effectuating the timely transfer of the patient to another health care provider willing
to comply with the [patient's or decisionmaker's] wishes.... (emphasis added)); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:8(lI) ("When the direction of an agent requires an act or omission
contrary to the moral or ethical principles or other standards of a health... care provider...,
the care provider shall allow for the transfer of the patient to another facility ... 
(emphasis added)).
17 0 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-506(5)(b) (West Supp. 1994) (health care providers
cannot be compelled to administer "medically inappropriate" treatment at the request
of a health care agent appointed under a medical durable power of attorney); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(A)(4) (providing that a physician cannot be required to
provide "medically inappropriate treatment ... to any patient [and that a physician's]
medical judgment with respect to the application of medical treatment or life-sustaining
procedures" may not be interfered with); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-611(a)-(b)
(physicians cannot be required to prescribe or render "medical treatment [they]
determine[] to be ethically inappropriate" or "medically ineffective.., under generally
accepted medical practices"); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 ("[A physician cannot be
required to] prescribe or render medical treatment to a patient that the physician
determines to be medically or ethically inappropriate. However, ... if the physician's
determination is contrary to the terms of an advance directive of a qualified patient or
the treatment decision of a person designated to make the decision .., the physician
shall make a reasonable effort to transfer the patient to another physician."); cf. OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.16(B)(2)(b) ("If the instruction of a [health care agent] is to use
or continue life-sustaining treatment [for a patient suffering from] a terminal condition
or in a permanently unconscious state, ... the attending physician... who.., is not
willing... to comply or allow compliance with that instruction, [presumably because
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"medically inappropriate" or "ethically inappropriate" treatment. In sum, a
sizable majority of the states recognize the right of a physician to decline to
provide medically inappropriate treatment or treatment that would offend the
physician's conscience.
2. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act and
the Baby K Case
Not all statutes, however, are read to adopt this view. In In re Baby K,171 the
Fourth Circuit held that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA) 172 "does not provide an exception for stabilizing treatment
physicians may deem medically and ethically inappropriate."173
EMTALA provides that hospitals or other health care facilities having
emergency departments and receiving funds under Medicare or Medicaid, 174
that are presented with persons suffering from an emergency medical
condition,175 must either provide treatment that would stabilize the
condition, 176 or effect a transfer 177 to another hospital after meeting several
conditions. 178 The purpose of EMTALA, also known as the Patient
the physician deems life-sustaining treatment inappropriate,] shall use or continue the
life-sustaining treatment... until a transfer... is made.").
17116 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
17242 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1731n re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 598. The lower court held that the hospital was obligated
to provide treatment under EMTALA, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993), The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) §§ 3(2),
302,42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12182 (Supp. V 1993), and on common law grounds. See In re
Baby K,-832 F. Supp. 1022,1027-31 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd on narrower grounds, 16 F.3d 590
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994). The Fourth Circuit found it unnecessary to
review the district court's reliance on the Rehabilitation Act, theADA, and common law
because the hospital was required to provide treatment under EMTALA. In re Baby K,
16 F.3d at 592 n.2.
174This is what is known under the statute as a "participating hospital." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(e)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
175An emergency medical condition is defined as "a medical condition manifesting
itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in (i)
placing the health of the individual.., in serious jeopardy; (ii) serious impairment to
bodily functions; or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part .... " Id.
§ 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993). This provision has been interpreted to mean any
condition posing an "imminent danger of death or serious disability." Thornton v.
Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1990).
17642 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
1771d. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B) (1988).
1781d. § 1395dd(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The main conditions require: (1) that the
transferring hospital inform the person of the hospital's obligation and risks of the
transfer, id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(i); (2) that a physician from the transferring hospital
certify that the benefits to be gained from the transfer outweigh the risks, id.
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Anti-Dumping Act,179 is to prevent hospitals from refusing emergency medical
care to individuals who lack insurance or financial resources.180 The Baby K
decision made it clear, though, that EMTALA applies to all individuals,
regardless of their ability to pay for emergency medical care.181
Baby K was placed on a ventilator immediately after birth, and a diagnosis
of anencephaly 82 was later confirmed. 183 Physicians encouraged Baby K's
mother to agree to the provision of palliative care, but discouraged aggressive
treatment, explaining that Baby K would be permanently unconscious and
would probably die very soon.184 Baby K's mother insisted on aggressive
treatment, which included the provision of breathing assistance with a
mechanical ventilator whenever Baby K had difficulty breathing.185 Physicians
contended that "such care was inappropriate"; 186 the prevailing standard of
care for anencephalics, the hospital argued, is to provide palliative care until
death.187 The hospital attempted to transfer Baby K, but no nearby hospitals
§ 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii); (3) that the transferring hospital provide medical treatment to
minimize the risk of transfer, id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A); (4) that the transferring hospital
confirm that the transferee, which has accepted the transfer, has available space and
qualified personnel, id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(B); and (5) that the transfer be effected with
qualified personnel and appropriate equipment, id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(D).
179 Anadumaka ex rel. Anadumaka v. Edgewater Operating Co., 823 F. Supp. 507, 510
(N.D. Ill. 1993).
180 See, e.g., Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 n.2 (11th Cir. 1994); Miller v.
Medical Ctr., 22 F.3d 626, 628 (5th Cir. 1994); Brooks v. Maryland General Hosp., Inc.,
996 F.2d 708,710 (4th Cir. 1993); Carodenuto v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,
593 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
1811n re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir.) (citing Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977
F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992); Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir.
1991); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037,1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917F.2d 266,268 (6th Cir. 1990)), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
182Anencephaly is a congenital malformation of the brain whereby the cerebral
hemispheres and cerebellum are absent. See Robert H. Haslam, The Nervous System, in
NELSON TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 1473, 1485 (Richard E. Behrman et al. eds., 14th ed.
1992). The anencephalic infant's bra instem is capable of sustaining vital bodily functions
for a short duration (i.e., a few days), but the infant possesses no potential for cognitive
functi6n or consciousness. Beth Brandon, Note, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors: A
Question of Life or Death, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 781, 784 (1990); see also In re Baby K, 16
F.3d at 592 (observing that BabyK, an anencephalic infant, is permanently unconscious,
has no cognitive abilities, and is unable to interact with her environment).




187In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.
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were willing to accept a transfer.1 88 When Baby K no longer needed the
resources of a pediatric intensive care unit, she was transferred to a nursing
home.189 A cycle developed whereby Baby K would be readmitted to the
hospital for acute respiratory problems, put on a ventilator, and sent back to
the nursing home once the respiratory condition subsided.190
After Baby K's second readmission, the hospital brought an action in the
federal court "to resolve the issue... whether it [wals obligated to provide
emergency medical treatment to [an anencephalic infant] that it deem[ed]
medically and ethically inappropriate."191 The court held that under EMTALA,
the hospital was required to provide Baby K with treatment upon arriving at
the hospital in respiratory distress.1 92 The court found that respiratory distress
qualifies as an emergency medical condition under EMTALA because "a failure
to provide 'immediate medical attention' would reasonably be expected to
cause serious impairment of [Baby K's] bodily functions."193 The court
concluded that because a transfer could not be arranged, the hospital was
required to stabilize Baby K's respiratory condition.194 A "straightforward"
application of EMTALA "requires the Hospital to provide respiratory support
through the use of a respirator or other means necessary to ensure adequate
ventilation."19 5
The hospital argued that Congress, in enacting EMTALA, did not intend to
require physicians to act outside the prevailing standard of medical care, and
that putting an anencephalic infant on a respirator exceeded this standard of
care.196 The court replied that the unambiguous language of EMTALA does
not provide for such an exception.197 The hospital also relied on a Virginia
statute,198 which permits a physician to decline to offer treatment viewed as
medically or ethically inappropriate, 199 to argue that EMTALA did not require
1 8 8Id. at 593.
1891d.
1 90 d.
191In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593.
1 9 21d. at 594-95.
193 d. at 594; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(ii).
1941n re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 594.
19 51d.
19 6 d. at 596.
19 7 d. The court "recognize[d] the dilemma facing physicians who are requested to
provide treatment they consider medically and ethically inappropriate," but noted that
the "appropriate branch to redress the[se] policy concerns ... is Congress." In re Baby
K, 16 F.3d at 596.
198VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990.
1 9 9 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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physicians to provide the treatment sought by Baby K's mother.200 The court
proclaimed:
EMTALA does not provide an exception for stabilizing treatment
physicians may deem medically or ethically inappropriate.
Consequently, to the extent that [the state statute] exempts physicians
from providing care they consider medically or ethically
inappropriate, it directly conflicts with the provisions of EMTALA that
require stabilizing treatment to be provided.
20 1
Consequently, the Virginia statute was preempted by EMTALA. 202 The court
refused to address the moral or ethical implications of providing aggressive
treatment to anencephalics. 203 The court only concluded that there was no
exception for treating anencephalics under EMTALA, just as EMTALA admits
no exception for "those with lung cancer, or those with muscular
dystrophy-all of whom may repeatedly seek emergency stabilizing treatment
for respiratory distress and also possess an underlying medical condition that
severely affects their quality of life and ultimately may result in their death."
204
The Baby K decision was heavily criticized.205 The American Academy of
Pediatrics declared that providing treatment to Baby K would "deviate sharply"
from generally accepted standards of ethics and medical care.206 Nevertheless,
EMTALA apparently does not provide an exception for cases like Baby K, in
which physicians believe that the provision of treatment, although effective in
200 1n re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597. The district court stated that EMTALA "does not admit
of any 'futility' or 'inhumane' exceptions." In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (E.D.
Va. 1993), affd on narrower grounds, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
The district court noted that even if itdid contain these exceptions, they would not apply
here. Id. The court found that using a ventilator to assist Baby K's respiratory functions
was not futile or inhumane. Id.
2011n re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597. 'he court also suggested that the Virginia statute did
not apply to medical decisionmaking for infants because it was part of an Act that dealt
with advance directives and surrogate decisionmaking on behalf of adult patients. Id.
n.10.
202 Id. at 597. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2, state law that conflicts with federal law such that compliance with both would
be impossible is preempted. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE ANDPROCEDURE § 12.1, at 62-63 (2d ed. 1992); see, e.g.,
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,248 (1984); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666
(1962).
203 1n re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 598.
2041d.
205 See generally George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standards of Emergency
Care-The Case of Baby K, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1542 (1994); Diane M. Gianelli, Doctors
Argue Futility of Treating Anencephalic Baby, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 21, 1994, at 5 (citing
the criticism of various experts); When Care Is Futile, Let Go, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 1994,
at 10A.
206Gianelli, supra note 205, at 5.
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stabilizing the patient's condition, is medically and ethically inappropriate. 207
This article argues that Baby K was correctly decided to the extent that the court
declined to read an exception into EMTALA that was not already there. 208
Furthermore, Baby K was correctly decided to the extent that individual
physicians, or a group of physicians at a particular hospital, should not deny
treatment on the basis that such treatment is medically inappropriate in their
view. To allow such unilateral decisions would be tantamount to pushing the
EMTALA mandates down the slippery slope.
EMTALA should be amended, however, to exempt physicians from
providing treatment when providing such treatment would force physicians
to act "contrary to [their] moral and ethical principles, when [those] principles
[are] recognized and accepted within a significant segment of the medical profession
....,209 The exemption should apply when providing treatment under the
circumstances would go beyond the prevailing standard of care, and would
consequently violate the health care provider's conscience. This would have
meant inevitable death for Baby K since, consistent with such an exemption,
the hospital could have withheld respiratory support from Baby K under the
prevailing standard of care for anencephalic infants. 210 Unfortunate as this
may be, it should be the very rare case in which treatment can be denied if this
proposed exemption were to make its way into EMTALA. Prevailing standards
of medical care should rarely call for the denial of treatment. Placing such an
exemption in EMTALA would bring it up to speed with the prevailing policy,
reflected in case law 2 11 and statutory law,212 that physicians should not be
obliged to render medically inappropriate treatment or participate in treatment
that violates their consciences. Thus, this article suggests that EMTALA should
embrace an exception whereby a physician would not be required to provide
treatment defined as medically inappropriate by the general population of
health care providers (i.e., an established standard of care) when providing
such treatment would violate that individual physician's sense of medical
ethics.
E. The Standard of Medical Care
Principles of medical malpractice dictate that physicians must act with the
degree of skill and care ordinarily possessed by a reasonable and prudent
physician in the same medical specialty acting under the same or similar
207See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597.
208See id.
209Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (Mass. 1986)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2101n re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596 (observing that the prevailing standard of medical care
for anencephalics is the provision of palliative treatment).
211 See supra notes 141-150 and accompanying text.
212See supra part llI.D.1.
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circumstances. 213 Departure from this prevailing standard of care may result
in professional malpractice liability214 or disciplinary action by state licensing
authorities.215 Departure may also constitute a breach of professional ethics. 216
When the standard of care demands that a treatment be provided for a
certain medical condition under a certain set of circumstances, barring any
reasonable alternative or a transfer of the patient, the physician must provide
that treatment or face the consequences of a breach of his professional duty.217
The physician must provide treatment even though the provision of treatment
would violate the physician's conscience. 218 A finding that a treatment is
medically inappropriate by a consensus of physicians, on the other hand, also
translates into a standard of care that individual physicians should follow.
Assuming there is a general consensus among physicians that a certain therapy
under certain circumstances is medically inappropriate, then physicians have
a professional duty not to offer the treatment. 219 To do otherwise would result
in a violation of the standard of care220 and a potential breach of ethics.221
213E.g., Walls v. Boyett, 226 S.W.2d 552,556 (Ark. 1950); Munro v. Regents of theUniv.
of Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 878, 882 (Ct. App. 1989); Marchlewski v. Casella, 106 A.2d 466,
467 (Conn. 1954); Hill v. Boughton, 1 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1941); Mitchell v. Had], 816
S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky. 1991); Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977); Johnson
v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 501, 518 (Wisc. 1980).
214E.g., Pepe v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Scardina v.
Colletti, 211 N.E.2d 762, 765 (111. App. Ct. 1965); Wood v. Posthuma, 310 N.W.2d 341,
343 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Mozingo ex rel. Thomas v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., Inc.,
415 S.E.2d 341, 345 (N.C. 1992).
215Andrew L. Hyams & Louis M. Dyll, Professional Practice: Licensure and Discipline,
in LEGAL MEDICINE: LEGAL DYNAMICS OF MEDICAL ENCOUNTERS 101,104 (Kathryn H. Falk
& Ellen B. Geisel eds., 2d ed. 1991). See generally McKay v. State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 86 P.2d 232 (Colo. 1938); Jaffe v. State Dep't of Health, 64 A.2d 330 (Conn.
1949); Kruegerv. Board of Professional Discipline, 836 P.2d 523 (Idaho 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1277 (1993).
216See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICs
125 (3d ed. 1989) (noting that by falling below the standard of care, a physician can
violate her obligation of nonmaleficence).
217See Morreim, supra note 33, at 36; see also Andrea J. Lairson, Comment, Reexamining
the Physician's Duty of Care in Response to Medicare's Prospective Payment System, 62 WASH.
L. REV. 791, 794 (1987) (declaring that a physician must act in accordance with the
standard of care when determining when and whether to discontinue treatment).
2 18 Sce Daar, supra note 30, at 1246 ("Assertion of a physician's professional conscience
will not mean that a doctor can offer a quality and degree of medical care that is below
accepted standards....").
2 19 See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians Be Changed
to Accommnodate New Modelsfor Rationing Health Care?, 140U. PA. L. REv. 1809,1831 (1992)
("[T]he standard of care is the ultimate test for physicians ... when evaluating whether
care should be provided or withheld from a patient.").
220Mere violation of the standard of care will not necessarily result in malpractice
liability. The patient must incur harm as a result of the physician's breach of the standard
of care. E.g., Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., Inc. v. Harbaugh, 174 F.2d 507,
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Under the model this article proposes, medical inappropriateness is a
determination made by the general population of physicians, 222 not by
individual physicians on a case-by-case basis. Under this model, a physician
should rarely, if ever, be required to offer medically inappropriate treatment
because the standard of care-the general consensus among physicians on the
appropriateness of the treatment-dictates that the treatment not be offered or
continued.
Generally, the standard of care is determined with reference to the customary
practice of physicians in their field of medicine.223 The standard of care is
typically established by expert testimony on the customary practice in the
profession or specialty.224 Medical literature, textbooks, institutional policies,
and guidelines established by accrediting agencies and professional groups all
play a significant role in establishing custom and thus in developing the
standard of care.225 Because the physician-refusal case is a fairly new
phenomenon in the medical community, customary practice would appear to
favor the provision of arguably inappropriate treatment.226 Over time,
however, after many more of these physician-refusal cases begin to surface,
customary practice may change. Medical literature and institutional policy, for
example, could be very influential in changing the way health care providers
approach situations in which patients demand potentially inappropriate
medical care. Hopefully, sometime in the near future, the medical profession
will reach some accord on the appropriateness of certain therapies under
508 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (Ct. App. 1967); Fall v.
White, 449 N.E.2d 628,636 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Paige v. Manuzak, 471 A.2d 758,766-67
(Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 476 A.2d 722 (Md. 1984).
22 1See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 104.
223JAMEs A. HENDERSON, JR & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 405 (3d ed.
1988); Barry R. Furrow, Malpractice Revisited: Of Medical Errors, Social Transformations,
and Tort Standards, 63 NEB. L. REV. 810,816 (1984);see, e.g., Campbell v. Palmer, 568 A.2d
1064,1067 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990); Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160,165 (Tex. 1977). Some
courts hold that customary practice is only evidence of the standard of care and is not
conclusive. E.g., Spears v. McKinnon, 270 S.W. 524, 526-27 (Ark. 1925); Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253,257 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 946 (1966); Toth v. Community Hosp., 239 N.E.2d 368, 373 (N.Y. 1968); Vassos v.
Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981). The consequence of this principle is that
customary practice will sometimes amount to negligence. See, e.g., Ludahl v. Rockford
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 235 N.E.2d 671, 674 (Il. App. Ct. 1968); Helling v. Carey, 519
P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974), legislatively overruled by WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290
(West 1988).
224Hirshfeld, supra note 219, at 1832.
2 2 5 See generally MICHAEL G. MACDONALD ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE§ 11.02[3][a] (1993).
226See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 33, at 36 (noting that physicians ordinarily provide
life support to patients experiencing "profoundly diminished life").
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particular circumstances, 227 thereby providing the individual practitioner with
a standard of care to which she may refer when administering or withdrawing
inappropriate treatment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The subjectivity inherent in futility determinations dictates that a physician's
unilateral conclusion that a treatment is futile should not determine the
withholding or withdrawal of treatment when the values of the patient and
physician conflict.228 One commentator befittingly suggests that "[tihe rapid
advance of the language of futility into the jargon of bioethics should be
followed by an equally rapid retreat."22 9 The focus, instead, should be on
whether a physician is obliged to offer or provide to a demanding patient
treatment deemed "medically and ethically inappropriate." Physicians
typically object to providing medically inappropriate treatment because
providing such treatment, in their view, would offend their personal or
professional consciences. 230 Generally, the law has tended to uphold the
physician's right to refuse to act contrary to his sense of medical ethics.231
This article concludes that the standard of medical care should govern
decisions not to offer treatment deemed medically inappropriate. If through
customary practice, the consensus of the general population of physicians is
that a certain therapy under a certain set of circumstances is medically
inappropriate, then a physician should not be obliged to offer that therapy, even
when the patient demands it. By forcing a physician to render medically
inappropriate treatment to the demanding patient, where such treatment
would violate the physician's sense of ethics and exceed the standard of care,
the physician is put into a position which the courts and legislatures have
generally sought to avoid. Although this model of medical decisionmaking
deviates somewhat from the shared decisionmaking model of the
physician-patient relationship, this modification is necessary to avoid the
erosion of medical professionalism.
This recommendation prevents abuse by precluding a physician's refusal to
treat when no established standard of care concerning the treatment at issue
exists. In other words, if only one physician or an indistinct group of physicians
deems treatment medically inappropriate, but there is no customary practice
among the general population of physicians, then a physician should not
227Some groups have begun drafting guidelines on inappropriate care in hopes of
attaining a consensus among health care providers. Diane M. Gianelli, Getting a Better
Fix on Futility: More Providers Seeking Consensus on How to Set Limits, AM. MED. NEWS,
Dec. 5, 1994, at 3. This process, however, is in its early stages. See id.
228See Lantos et al., supra note 5, at 82; supra part I.
229Truog et al., supra note 31, at 1563.
230See Loewy & Carlson, supra note 160, at 429.
231See supra part Im.
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unilaterally decide to withhold or withdraw treatment, even if doing so would
violate her own sense of medical ethics. This eliminates inter-physician
variability of health care delivery in clinical situations in which value
judgments abound.232
When a physician is presented with a situation in which the patient demands
medically inappropriate treatment, the provision of which contravenes the
physician's conscience, the physician should try to resolve the conflict
amicably. "Resolving the conflict" means explaining to the patient the
physician's opposition to the provision of treatment, stating the reasons why
the physician believes the treatment is inappropriate, and informing the patient
of the probable outcome. Of course, the inappropriate treatment might not be
offered in the first place, but the standard of care will dictate whether it should
be offered. If the physician and patient cannot come to terms after discussion,
then the physician should, with reasonable diligence, attempt to seek a transfer.
If a health care provider willing to administer the treatment is found, this will
avoid the dilemma for the physician. Finally, if a transfer is not feasible, then
whether the physician is obliged to render the treatment will depend on an
established standard of care.233
Under the model proposed in this article, if an established standard of care
contemplates that a given therapy under the circumstances is medically
inappropriate, and a reasonable transfer cannot be effectuated, then an
individual physician may unilaterally withdraw or withhold treatment despite
patient, proxy, or surrogate demands to the contrary. If, however, there is no
established standard of care, and if a reasonable transfer cannot be effectuated,
then the unilateral withdrawal or withholding of treatment by a physician
should not be sanctioned. To do otherwise would allow an individual
physician's value judgments about the appropriateness of medical treatment
to dictate the outcome in individual cases, resulting in widespread
inconsistencies in the delivery of health care. While adherence to the model
proposed in this article may sometimes result in a unilateral decision by a
23 2 One commentator observed this potential variability. See Boozang, supra note 32,
at 42 ("[Ilt is uncertain [whether] physicians can make futility judgments accurately,
reliably, and consistently." (emphasis added)).
233 Cf Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 6, at 1144. Jecker and Pearlman recommend that
futility determinations be guided by "broad professional and community standards."
Id. They suggest that if a physician determines that a treatment is futile under these
standards, they need not obtain permission from the patient to withdraw or withhold
such treatment. Id. This is somewhat comparable to the recommendation set forth in
this article. However, this article argues that futility determinations should play no part
in a decision whether to withdraw or withhold treatment unless both the physician and
patient agree on a course of treatment. Furthermore, under the recommendation set
forth in this article, physicians have an obligation to discuss with the patient why they
believe the treatment they wish to withdraw or withhold is medically inappropriate. If
after discussion, the physician and patient cannot come to terms, then the physician
should, with reasonable diligence, attempt a transfer. Under Jecker and Pearlman's
recommendation, once the physician determines that treatment is futile, then the
physician has no further obligation to the patient. See id.
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physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, such instances
will be rare, and in any event, such decisions are vital to the preservation of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession.
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APPENDIX A
Part A - Statutes Compelling Transfer
ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.050(a) (1994) (advance directives)
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(C)(1) (1993) (advance directives, proxies,
surrogate decisionmakers)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-14-507(1)-(2), -18-113(5), -18.5-102(2) (West 1987
& Supp. 1994) (proxies, advance directives, surrogate decisionmakers)
D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2427(b) (1995) (advance directives)
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-13(e) (Bums 1993) (advance directives)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,107(a) (1992) (advance directives)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112(2) (1993) (advance directives, proxies,
surrogate decisionmakers)
W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-7(b), -30A-10(b) (1995) (advance directives, proxies)
See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.308(2) (West Supp. 1995) (advance directives,
proxies)(health care provider must either transfer the patient or carry out the
instructions of the patient or proxy); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, § 14
(West Supp. 1995) (proxies) (health care provider must either effect a transfer,
carry out the wishes of the proxy, or seek judicial relief).
Part B - Statutes Requiring Reasonable Effort to Transfer
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-207 (Michie Supp. 1991) (advance directives,
proxies, surrogate decisionmakers)
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1995) (advance directives)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-580a (West Supp. 1995) (advance directives,
proxies)
HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-11(b) (Supp. 1992) (advance directives)
IDAHO CODE § 39-4508 (1993) (advance directives, proxies)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.8(1) (West 1989) (advance directives, surrogate
decisionmakers)
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.7(B) (West 1992) (advance directives,
proxies, surrogate decisionmakers)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-708 (West Supp. 1994) (advance directives,
proxies, surrogate decisionmakers)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145C.11(2)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (proxies)
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.030(1) (Vernon 1992) (advance directives)
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-203 (1995) (advance directives, proxies, surrogate
decisionmakers); id. § 50-10-103(2) (DNR orders)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-409 (Supp. 1994) (advance directives)
NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.628 (Michie 1991) (advance directives, proxies,
surrogate decisionmakers)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-5(B) (Michie 1994) (advance directives)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-08, -06.5-09(2) (1991) (advance directives,
proxies)




OR. REV. STAT. § 127.625(2)(d) (Supp. 1994) (advance directives)
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5409(a) (Supp. 1995) (advance directives)
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-7 (Supp. 1994) (advance directives)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-11 (1994) (advance directives)
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.016(c) (West 1992) (advance
directives, surrogate decisionmakers)
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987 (Michie 1994) (advance directives, proxies,
surrogate decisionmakers)
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.07(1)(a)(3), 155.50(1)(b) (West Supp. 1994) (advance
directives, proxies)
Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-104(b) (1994) (advance directives)
See also GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(b) (Harrison 1994) (advance directives)
(physician who declines to follow the patient's living will must, at the election
of the patient's next of kin or legal guardian, either attempt a transfer or allow
the patient's next of kin or guardian to find another physician willing to give
effect to the patient's directive); S.C. CODE ANN. §§44-77-100, 62-5-504(R) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1994) (advance directives, proxies) (physician who declines to
carry out the instructions of the patient or proxy must make a reasonable effort
to find another physician willing to give effect to those instructions, and, upon
finding a willing physician, must transfer the patient).
Part C - Statutes Requiring Permission or Assistance with Transfer
ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a) (1990) (advance directives)
Ill. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, paras. 40/35, 45/4-8(b)-(c) (Smith-Hurd 1992)
(proxies, surrogate decisionmakers)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.634(1)-(2), .982(1)-(2) (Baldwin 1991) (advance
directives, proxies)
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-613(a)(2) (1994) (proxies, surrogate
decisionmakers)
MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-115(2) (1993) (advance directives)
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.830(1), (3) (Vernon Supp. 1995) (proxies)
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-3428(2), -3432(3) (Supp. 1994) (proxies)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:8(11) (Supp. 1994) (proxies)
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2984(4) (McKinney 1993) (proxies)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.16(B) (Anderson 1993) (proxies); id.
§§ 2133.02(D)(2), .10(A) (Anderson 1994) (advance directives)
TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.008(c) (West Supp. 1995) (proxies)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3459(b) (1989) (proxies); id. tit. 18, § 5256 (1987)
(advance directives)
W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30B-10(b), -30C-9(c) (1995) (surrogate decisionmakers,
DNR orders)
See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (Supp. 1994) (advance directives)
(physician who is unwilling to give effect to the provisions of the patient's
living will shall, at the option of the patient or patient's next of kin or legal
guardian, "make every reasonable effort to assist in the transfer of the patient
to another physician... [willing to] comply with the [patient's] declaration").
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The aforementioned statutes essentially codify the view taken in Abrmovice and
Brophy. See supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
Part D - Statutes Not Expressly Requiring Physicians to Attempt a Transfer
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 35/3(d) (advance directives)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06(1)(a) (advance directives)
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.625(2)(c) (proxies, surrogate decisionmakers)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.060(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1995) (advance
directives)
Part E - Ambiguous Statutes
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-8(2)-(3) (proxies) (physician must make necessary
arrangements to effect the patient's transfer)
IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-7-4(b) (Bums Supp. 1995) (proxies) (physician must
take all steps necessary to effect a transfer)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6(II) (1990) (advance directives) (physician
who declines to give effect to the patient's declaration "shall . . . make the
necessary arrangements to effect the transfer of the... patient... to another
physician who has been chosen by the.., patient or by the [patient's] family"
(emphasis added))
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-62(b) (West Supp. 1995) (advance directives, proxies)
(physician declining to follow the patient's advance directive or the proxy's
instructions "shall act in good faith ... to effect an appropriate, respectful, and
timely transfer of care" (emphasis added))
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-6 (proxies) (physician must make necessary
arrangements to effect the patient's transfer)
Part F - Silent Statutes
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4750(c) (West Supp. 1995)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.9(2) (West Supp. 1995)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-173(2)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-208(c) (1991)
WYo. STAT. § 3-5-208(b) (Supp. 1995)
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